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THE CONGRESSIONAL MANDATE AGAINST A
FEDERAL STRIKE: THE GOVERNMENT'S
ENFORCEMENT OF THAT STATUTORY
GUIDANCE*
J. E. MURDOCK III**
LEE ARNOLD***
C ONGRESS HAS repeatedly and emphatically forbidden
federal employees from striking. In the landscape of the
law, this simple concept stands in stark contrast to an other-
wise jumbled mass of obscure doctrines and bewildering stat-
utes. No person or group is allowed to halt essential govern-
ment services.
Despite clear and explicit warnings from each branch of the
federal government, the Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization (PATCO) on August 3, 1981 ignored available
alternatives and chose to go on strike. Robert Poli, PATCO's
President, in calling the strike promised that "the skies will
be silent." In the face of a massive and unprecedented strike,
the supply of air traffic control services nevertheless contin-
ued uninterrupted, albeit at a reduced level.
The myriad facets of this dispute, factually, legally and
philosophically, are impossible to summarize in a short essay.
We will outline the historical relationship between the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and PATCO, the law gov-
erning collective bargaining with federal employees, and the
events of 1981. It is our position that the government cor-
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rectly reacted to this attempted shutdown of the national air
transportation system. The time-consuming process of re-
building the air traffic control system is an investment against
future threats to the provision of essential government ser-
vices. Still, the strike and its resolution raises questions about
labor-management relations involving public employees.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF AN ILLEGAL STRIKE: PRE-1981 EVENTS
The sources of air traffic controller discontent in 1981 can
be found in the 1960's. During the early and mid-1960's, use
of the nation's airspace by both commercial and general avia-
tion grew sharply. Initially, the air traffic control system rap-
idly expanded to meet this demand. One negative aspect of
this expansion was a depersonalization of the relationship be-
tween management (the FAA) and labor (the controllers). To
handle future growth in air traffic, the FAA concentrated on
developing new technology, particularly the combination of
computers with improved radar systems. Limited attention
was given to increasing the system's manpower. The ability to
change new and experimental technology into operational
hardware and software systems was hampered by limited
funds. Because neither increased manpower nor new technol-
ogy was used to expand the system's capacity, further in-
creases in air traffic were handled by imposing greater work-
loads on controllers.
Naturally, the controllers reacted. Their discontent was
channeled into collective action. A number of local bargaining
units, affiliated with either the National Association of Gov-
ernment Employees or the American Federation of Govern-
ment Employees, were formed. PATCO was created in 1968 as
a professional society of controllers interested in improving
the air traffic control system. PATCO's purpose quickly
changed to that of a labor organization. Within two years of
its creation, PATCO initiated the first major job action taken
by controllers. Between March 25 and April 13, 1970, approxi-
mately 4,000 controllers participated in a nationwide sick-out.
Enormous economic injury was inflicted on the public.
Several reactions occurred. Both the government and the
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Air Transport Association of America (ATA) obtained prelim-
inary injunctions against the sick-out. PATCO initially defied
these court orders, thereby giving ATA a claim for damages.
PATCO subsequently consented to the entry of a permanent
injunction that prohibited its future participation in strike ac-
tivity. In return, ATA waived its damage claims. In a separate
administrative action, the government barred for five months
PATCO's bid to become the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for air controllers.' No organization of federal employees
previously had received such punishment. Finally, individual
controllers were either dismissed or suspended.
In 1972, PATCO won certification as the controllers' exclu-
sive national bargaining representative. Contracts between the
FAA and PATCO were signed in 1973, 1975, and 1978. Sub-
stantial reforms resulted. The FAA improved its management
attitude by listening and affirmatively responding to control-
ler's complaints. Among these responses were the hiring of ad-
ditional controllers and the introduction of improved
equipment.
Despite these changes, PATCO became more militant. In
1976, FAA and PATCO jointly proposed that the Civil Service
Commission upgrade the job classification of certain controller
positions. In effect, both FAA and PATCO sought to increase
the pay of these controllers. The Commission's study on the
proposals was delayed. PATCO responded in late July with a
"work-to-the-rule" slowdown timed to occur during the 1976
political conventions. Assurances that the study would be
completed by August 30 ended this job action.
When the draft study was released, it rejected reclassifica-
tion on the grounds that the existing level of work was insuffi-
cient to justify an increase in controller pay levels. Both FAA
and PATCO objected to this conclusion. PATCO went further
by again threatening a slowdown. The Commission quickly re-
considered the study and awarded a substantial number of
' Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., Inc., 1 Decisions & Reports on Rulings
of Ass't Sec'y of Labor for Labor Mgmt. Rel. 71 (1971); Professional Air Traffic Con-
trollers Org., Inc., I Decisions & Reports on Rulings of Ass't Sec'y of Labor for Labor
Mgmt. Rel. 268 (1971).
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upward reclassifications. From PATCO's perspective, the
threat of a job action produced the desired result.
Yet another illegal slowdown occurred in 1978. In the con-
tract signed during March of that year, the FAA authorized
all controllers to participate in overseas "familiarization
flights." By riding in the cockpit's jump seat, a controller
could acquaint himself with the cockpit environment and ob-
serve the operation of the air traffic control system from the
pilot's perspective. Airlines were not under a duty to provide
these privileges although many did so. Faced with a flood of
requests for free overseas travel, the airlines perceived abuse
of this program and placed some restrictions on its use.
PATCO responded in May and June of 1978 with another
slowdown. ATA moved to enforce the 1970 injunction which
prohibited PATCO from engaging in strike activity. The
Court found PATCO in contempt and awarded ATA $100,000
in damages2 The slowdown ended but PATCO suffered more
than just financial loss. In 1972, Congress established the Air
Traffic Controller Second Career Program. Through the pro-
gram, controllers, who were disqualified from continuing their
air traffic control duties, could obtain government-paid trainf-
ing for second careers. A participant in the program remained
on full salary for two years. In the summer of 1978, Congress
followed a recommendation by the General Accounting Office
and rejected future funding for this program.
PATCO responded to these events by hardening its posi-
tion. Slowdowns were abandoned. The next job action was
scheduled to be a strike. In May of 1978, a strike fund was
established. Labeled the "National Controller Subsistence
Fund," the monies were earmarked for members who partici-
pated in a nationally sanctioned job action, and were subse-
quently dismissed or suspended. By early 1981, the fund con-
tained more than $3 million. In the Spring of 1980, PATCO
Executive Vice President Robert Meyer sent a strike plan to
PATCO locals under the title "education package." The plan
2 Air Transp. Ass'n of America v. Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org., 453 F.
Supp. 1287 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 594 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944
(1979).
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advised locals to establish communications networks and
strike-related committees, to make arrangements for bail
bondsmen and legal services, and suggested members prepare
financially for a strike.
The FAA challenged these actions before the Federal Labor
Relations Authority (FLRA) as unfair labor practices under 5
U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7) which prohibits a union's participation in
or condonation of strike-related activity. In addition to a copy
of the plan and the resolution authorizing the strike fund,
FAA offered additional statements and publications of
PATCO officers and members as proof of extensive planning
for a 1981 strike. Despite the weight of the evidence, the
FLRA refused to draw the obvious conclusion: these acts were
in contemplation of an illegal strike and thus constituted an
unfair labor practice.
II. 1981: NEGOTIATIONS, STRIKE, CONTINUED PROVISION OF
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SERVICES
A. The Law Governing Collective Bargaining with Federal
Employees
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 establishes
a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of federal labor-
management relations." Previously, this relationship was gov-
erned only by Executive Order." In 1978, however, an inde-
pendent agency, the Federal Labor Relations Authority
(FLRA), was created to enforce this scheme. Among its duties,
the FLRA conducts elections to select exclusive bargaining
representatives, adjudicates complaints of unfair labor prac-
tices, and resolves exceptions to arbitration awards. In many
ways, the FLRA plays a role analogous to that of the National
Labor Relations Board. Resolution of deadlocked negotiations
is handled by the Federal Service Impasses Panel, an entity
within FLRA.6 When negotiations have reached an impasse,
a 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1979).
" Exec. Order No. 11,491, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,605 (1969); Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27
Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
5 U.S.C. § 7105 (1979).
6 Id. § 7119.
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either party may resort to consultation with the Panel. In or-
der to resolve the dispute, the Panel may simply recommend
that both parties use a particular procedure. If this fails, the
Panel may impose a binding solution.
Although similarities exist with collective bargaining in the
private sector, federal labor-management relations are signifi-
cantly different. In granting federal employees the right to
collectively bargain, Congress has specifically reserved certain
rights to management. Wages, work assignments, and hiring
decisions are not subject to negotiation.7 Procedures for the
exercise of management authority, methods of handling em-
ployee grievances, the number and types of employees as-
signed to a work project, and the methods of performing work
are proper subjects of bargaining.' Within these bounds, both
sides are under a duty to bargain in good faith. A breach of
this duty is an unfair labor practice.'
Federal employees are prohibited from striking 0 and take
an oath to obey that law.11 Violation of this prohibition is a
felony, punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 and/or
imprisonment for not more than one year.12
B. 1981 Negotations: Agreement Then Strike
It is within this general outline of the law governing federal
labor-management relations that the 1981 negotiations should
be examined. These talks produced an agreement in June
which was first accepted by PATCO's leadership but was sub-
sequently rejected by that same leadership. Further talks in
late July, which more closely resembled an ultimatum from
PATCO, led to a deadlock. Instead of using the services of the
Federal Service Impasses Panel, PATCO called for a strike.
FAA and PATCO began negotiating on February 12, 1981.
The union presented a proposed contract consisting of ninety-
' Id. § 7106(a) (1979).
8 Id. § 7106(b) (1979).
Id. § 7116(a)(5), (b)(5) (1979).
5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1966).
5 U.S.C. § 3333 (1955).18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1966).
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six articles. Only forty-one of these articles were negotiable.
Approximately five of the proposals dealt with the technology
and methods of performing work, which are negotiable at the
agency's option,"8 but the FAA elected not to exercise that op-
tion. The law barred negotiations on nearly fifty of the arti-
cles. Either these proposals interfered with exclusive manage-
ment rights or involved matters totally within the authority of
Congress. For example, PATCO's demand for a thirty-two
hour workweek, a $10,000 lump sum payment to each control-
ler, a revised pay scale with automatic annual increases, and
expanded annual and sick leave benefits could only be
achieved through legislation. When PATCO broke off talks on
April 29, after thirty-seven sessions, agreement had been
reached on only four of the forty-one negotiable articles de-
spite the exchange of written proposals and extensive across-
the-table bargaining. PATCO's proposed contract would have
cost an additional $1.1 billion a year, an exorbitant sum, par-
ticularly in light of the electorate's mandate that the new Ad-
ministration reduce federal spending.
On May 22, PATCO made the next move. At its annual
convention, a strike date of June 22 was set. A formal strike
vote was to be taken during the early morning of the 22nd. If
the required number of "yes" votes were received, the strike
was scheduled to begin at 7 A.M. Robert Poli repeated his
often quoted statement, "the only illegal strike is an unsuc-
cessful strike. 1 A
Several people begged to differ. During the four week pe-
riod following the strike threat, the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches of the government repeatedly warned
PATCO both of a strike's illegality and its potential
consequences.
J. Lynn Helms, Administrator of the FAA, warned of the
illegality of a strike in a memo to all nonunion air traffic con-
trol supervisors. He directed the supervisors to inform their
workers that a strike would be a violation of the law. Helms
also sent a letter to the home address of each controller.
13 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (1979).
" N.Y. Times, May 24, 1981, at 24.
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Again, the illegality of a strike was pointed out. Enclosed with
the letter was a Justice Department memo which announced
that the Department would consider all civil, criminal and ad-
ministrative actions in response to an illegal strike. As June
22 approached, Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis
warned that the government would take a very strong stand
against a strike, including the use of civil and criminal penal-
ties. On June 16, the Justice Department again gave notice
that strong actions would be taken in response to a strike.
Congressman Norman Mineta, Chairman of the Aviation
Subcommittee of the Committee on Public Works and Trans-
portation, sent a letter to Robert Poli requesting an explana-
tion for the strike threat, since Mr. Poli had previously testi-
fied before Congress that a strike would not occur. The Senate
Commerce Committee sent Mr. Poli a similar letter and fur-
ther warned that a strike would end the chances for passage
of a PATCO sponsored bill to increase controller's wages. Ad-
ditional Congressmen independently notified PATCO of a
strike's illegality and consequences.
Finally, the courts issued their own warning. PATCO had
moved on jurisdictional grounds to vacate the 1970 permanent
injunction against strike activities. On June 18, Judge Platt of
the Eastern District of New York ruled that the injunction
remained in effect and "gently reminded" PATCO's members
of their duty to obey the law.
In the meantime, bargaining between PATCO and FAA re-
sumed on June 15 under the auspices of the Federal Media-
tion and Conciliation Service. On June 19 Secretary Lewis be-
came directly involved in these sessions. A last minute
agreement averted a June 22 strike.
The first part of the agreement covered personnel policies
and practices. The second part consisted of four legislative
proposals to improve controller benefits by approximately $40
million. This latter part was exclusively within the authority
of Congress. However, the Department of Transportation and
FAA agreed to support the proposals before Congress. In ef-
fect, PATCO had successfully bargained for wages, an unprec-
edented event in Federal labor relations.
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Ten days later, PATCO's Executive Board, consisting of its
Regional Vice Presidents, Executive Vice President Robert
Meyer, and President Poli issued a unanimous recommenda-
tion to reject the contract. PATCO's membership followed
that advice in late July.
PATCO notified Secretary Lewis of the rejection on July 29
and requested an immediate resumption of negotiations. On
July 31 the union gave the FAA seventy-two hours to reach an
agreement. In negotiation sessions with Secretary Lewis, Rob-
ert Poli insisted that substantially all of PATCO's original
proposals be accepted in order to avoid a strike. These esca-
lated demands were rejected.
Again, PATCO and its members were fully warned of a
strike's consequences. On July 28, a letter signed by fifty-five
United States Senators was sent to every controller. The Sen-
ators reminded the controllers of their legal duty not to strike.
Each signatory promised to urge the President to use the full
force of the law in the event of a strike. A similar letter signed
by seventeen United States Congressmen was sent to the con-
trollers on July 29. Nevertheless, a strike began at 7 A.M. Au-
gust 3, 1981.
C. Reaction to the Strike
1. Continuation of Air Traffic Control Services
At the onset of the strike, the FAA immediately imple-
mented a long standing and well publicized plan to continue
operation of the air traffic control system. The plan was devel-
oped after the 1978 job action as a uniform method of han-
dling future job actions, rather than merely continuing the re-
liance on ad hoc reactions to situations. Created with input
from various users of the nation's airspace and air traffic con-
trol system, the plan gave priorities to different classes of air
traffic. 15 The extent to which traffic in a particular priority
classification could be handled was determined by the number
of available controllers at different facilities. Supervisors, non-
striking controllers, and other FAA employees qualified to
" See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,100 (1980).
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staff air traffic control positions filled the gaps left by strikers.
In addition, military controllers were used in certain facilities.
Since its creation, the plan has been constantly updated.
Even amidst the uncertainty which accompanied the begin-
ning of the strike, the plan was successfully implemented. On
August 3 most scheduled carriers reported 60-80 per cent of
their flights operating. That figure rose to 80 per cent of all
scheduled traffic a few days after the strike began.
The situation stabilized within a week, and now the air
space is allocated with more certainty. However, all demand
cannot be fulfilled at every airport, particularly during peak
periods and will not be for some time to come. Nevertheless,
most users have shown imagination in overcoming the sys-
tem's capacity restraints. The safety of the air traffic control
system has not been and'will not be compromised by author-
izing additional flights. Expanded training of new controllers
will allow a gradual increase in the system's capacity.
2. The law is invoked
When the strike began the government initially sought to
have the striking controllers return to work. At 4:35 A.M. on
August 3, the United States obtained a temporary restraining
order from the District Court for the District of Columbia en-
joining PATCO, its officers, and its members from commenc-
ing the threatened strike. As the day progressed, it became
apparent this order was being ignored. By late afternoon, the
District Court found PATCO and Robert Poli in contempt
and created a series of fines to be imposed if the strike contin-
ued. Since the national union would not obey the court, a le-
gal contingency plan, developed by the FAA and the Justice
Department, was implemented. United States Attorneys ob-
tained temporary injunctions against PATCO locals and their
members in eighty-six of the ninety-one Federal judicial
districts.
Administrative relief was also sought. On the morning of
August 3, an unfair labor practice charge against PATCO was
filed with the Federal Labor Relations Authority. Later in the
day, the FLRA issued its own complaint against PATCO. It
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sought and received a temporary restraining order barring
PATCO's strike activity.
At 11 A.M. on August 3, President Reagan warned that
those controllers still on strike 48 hours from that time would
be fired. Secretary Lewis later construed that order to permit
controllers to report to work at the beginning of their next
scheduled shift after 11 A.M. August 5 without being fired.
In addition to the government's actions, ATA moved to en-
force the 1970 permanent injunction. Judge Platt found
PATCO in contempt and imposed a schedule of damages that
increased the award to ATA as the strike continued. Eventu-
ally, ATA obtained a judgment of $4.5 million and attached
most, if not all, of PATCO's funds.
Despite these actions, most of the controllers remained on
strike and were fired. Contemporaneously, the government's
legal strategy focused on ending PATCO's status as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative for the controllers. On August
10, John Fenton, the Chief Administrative Law Judge for the
FLRA, held a hearing on the unfair labor practice charge. The
government used witnesses, videotape, and documents to
prove that a strike had indeed occurred. PATCO did not offer
a rebuttal. On August 14, Judge Fenton found PATCO had
committed an unfair labor practice by willfully and intention-
ally calling for and participating in a strike against the FAA.
He recommended revocation of PATCO's status as the exclu-
sive bargaining representative. This ruling was appealed to
the full FLRA. After oral argument on September 16, the
FLRA issued its order on October 22. All three members
agreed with Judge Fenton's findings. Two members voted to
revoke PATCO's status, while Chairman Haughton indicated
he would support the majority unless the union called off the
strike and promised to obey the no-strike provisions of the
law. Chairman Haughton subsequently joined the majority af-
ter PATCO filed an alleged compliance notice that failed to
meet these conditions. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia stayed the FLRA order on October 22, but lifted
the stay on October 27. The FLRA order is currently on ap-
peal before that court.
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The Justice Department has continued to pursue strike-re-
lated litigation. Civil contempt penalties were sought and ob-
tained in several jurisdictions. Because striking controllers
were fired, some court orders were modified to remove provi-
sions requiring controllers to return to work. Other provisions
such as those regulating picketing were left intact or strength-
ened to meet particular problems. Also, for the first time,
strikers have been prosecuted under the criminal statute for-
bidding Federal employee strike activity. About eighty crimi-
nal indictments have been returned. Finally, virtually all of
the nearly 11,400 fired controllers have appealed their termi-
nations to the Merit Systems Protection Board.
III. THE AFTERMATH
The decision to fire over 11,000 striking controllers was dif-
ficult and costly. Air traffic will operate at constrained levels
for about two years, until the system is rebuilt. That recon-
struction requires time-consuming training of new controllers.
Although harsh, this decision was the only course of action
available short of the FAA abdicating its statutory
responsibilities.
Under the United States Constitution, the executive branch
has a duty to provide essential government services and pro-
tect the public. Congress has not given labor unions or their
members the right to withhold or eliminate these services
through a strike. Indeed, strikes are expressly prohibited. The
actions taken to uphold this law serve as a singularly clear
signal that essential government services will be maintained
and the public interest will be protected in the face of organ-
ized efforts to disrupt those services.
Still, the PATCO strike raises important questions in the
context of labor-management relations involving public em-
ployees. Governments provide many essential public services
such as air traffic control, police and fire protection, medical
aid, and sanitation that have no available substitutes. A strike
by government employees denies the public these services.
Until the blackmail is paid, the public is held hostage. This
result is unacceptable in our society and thus is forbidden by
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the federal government and by many state governments.
Yet removing this power to strike from labor imposes a sub-
stantial duty on government managers. They must be diligent
in responding to the legitimate needs of their employees.
Without thoughtful management one finds employee discon-
tent, a lower quantity and quality of work, and the loss of ex-
perienced, competent people. Bad management, like a strike,
disrupts and deprives the public of the supply of effective and
efficient public services.
Both labor and management should remember their respec-
tive duties as they engage in the collective bargaining process.
In the 1981 negotiations, the FAA took extraordinary steps,
including bargaining in areas reserved to Congress, to meet
this high duty. PATCO rejected that effort, ignored the avail-
ability of the Federal Service Impasses Panel, dismissed all
warnings about the risks of a job action, and proclaimed the
only appropriate remedy was the extreme - a strike. In ef-
fect, PATCO snatched defeat from the jaws of victory by in-
correctly perceiving its ability to shutdown the air transporta-
tion system and the resolve of the FAA to maintain that
system. Thus, PATCO engaged in an act of self-destruction.
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